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J’ACCUSE!
ATTRIBUTION OF BLAME WHEN
SOFTWARE IS AN ACTOR
J. Garfield and . resner Worcester University
Abstract
The desire for closure after an accident may be hastened by the attribution of blame. This is particularly
attractive in situations where complex factors may distance the understanding of attribution from those who
may not be familiar with all vectors towards the failure causing the accident. The keyword here is ‘accident’
suggesting that deliberate action/s have not been the cause. It is pertinent to establish systems – such as those
responsible for process control where it may be argued that the risk of remote, malicious intervention was not
readily foreseeable at the time of their realization. The paper puts forward a framework for the elaboration of
requirements with a focus on organizational factors as a way of teasing out problems in early development. The
objective is to achieve a sense of assurance that due diligence is both done and seen to be done in an
increasingly non-deterministic operational environment.

Keywords: accidents, attribution of blame failures, trustworthy software, requirements engineering,
business IS/IT alignment.

1.0 Context: systemic consideration v. witch hunting
Checkland’s soft systems methodology - SSM (Checkland, 1985) decomposes the analysis of
the most complex system into what may be the simplest practical consideration of its
components. These components are those which allow an understanding of the
communication and control (Weiner, 1961) that goes on inside the system (transformation)
and how that affects the world outside that system (environment). This would apply to the
minor inconvenience caused by some deficiency in functionality through to a significant
failure resulting in death of one or more victims of the system who should have been the
system’s beneficiary.
Staying with Checkland’s nomenclature, information technology is designed to effect some
form of transformation either of data for the sake of information (data processing) or for the
sake of controlling any number of physical processes (for example SCADA1 or fly-by-wire
technology). A system’s boundaries are defined by a combination of the environment (or
environments) housing the system and its components. The potential for system complexity
as a product of interacting subsystems provided by a combination of integrated and
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Supervisory control and data acquisition of industrial control systems.

1

segregated supply chains can be seen in Figure 1 which was created to explain a superseded
version of system life cycle standard ISO/IEC 15288 (2015)2.

Figure 1: The system and the subsystems – the challenge of defining the boundaries ISO/IEC 15288
(2015)

The relevance of a system and its purpose are viewed by the interpretation of three classes of
human components (Figure 2): the customer (or client) beneficiary (or victim), the actor –
operator or creator, and the owner (who has the controlling stake as to whether the system has
the right to continue to be). These roles suggest some natural divestment of responsibilities
(ISO/IEC 38500, 2015).
Software continues to be until it is decommissioned (ISO/IEC 15288, 2015). The through-life
cycle governance challenge is to define the responsibilities of individuals and groups in an
organisation (or the inevitable supply chain) and to get them to understand and accept that
these responsibilities must be met (ISO 31000, 2009 and ISO/IEC 38500, 2015). This ought
to happen without the need to seek out accountabilities because this often signals deep failure
and a desire to allocate a scapegoat (Barzun, 2014) in the event of a problem rather than a
positive attitude to on-going problem solving. Governance demands that information
technology policies, practices and decisions show respect for human behaviour (ISO/IEC
38500, 2015) so the attribution of blame for an incident where software control is part of the
basic design concept should be tempered with consideration of the intention of the operators,
2

The system lifecycle view is the foundation for trustworthy software according to PAS 754 (2014).
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and the compliance of the developers and their governance and management structures (ISO
9001, 2008). So, we may posit that without deliberate, probably malicious, intention there is
no fair attribution of blame to the focal actor in the software life cycle at the time of an
accident.
The software development cycle is well documented within the Software Engineering Body
of Knowledge (SwEBoK) (Bourque and Fariley, 2014) and standardized (ISO/IEC 12207,
ISO:2008).

It is custom practice to release significant software into the production

environment with known defects and an expectation that further defects – often manifesting
as security vulnerabilities – will emerge when the software is in use. Here, we define defect
as a condition in the software where it fails to operate in a manner explicitly – or implicitly –
defined by the software’s requirements.

3

Figure 2 Roles in the software life cycle from a soft systems perspective
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1.1 Failure of systems
Systemic failure – such as the destruction of an entity controlled by software (for example,
the ill-fated flight AF447 Bureau d’Enquêtes, 2012) or the failure of an entity to successfully
complete its mission (such as a patriot missile battery, GAO, 1992) or from some aspects of
both – may at some time during post-morta enquiry be attributed to the cause popularly
labelled ‘human error’. Speculation as to the cause of loss of the 1986 Chinook helicopter in
the Shetland Isles and flight AF447 over the Atlantic in 2009 were attributed (at least for
some time) to this taxon of failure. Human error is not a helpful epithet. In its context as an
adjective, the term human implies something socially acceptable to a community of people.
We therefore propose that the label of human error is therefore an oxymoron unless it refers
to a doing something inhuman by mistake. The operator user and the developer maintainer
are all parts of the system.
Computing cases (.org) (Miller et al., 2016) categorises failures where people are to blame as
those caused directly or where failure to act had disastrous consequences. Rather more
helpfully, systemic definitions propose of a man-machine waring with man-task misfits with
the cause typically being attributable to a design error. This supports a less biased inference
of blame through suitable analysis of the life cycle. One might propose ISO/IEC 15288 as a
systems model to label the stage - or stages - of the life cycle at which the defect was
introduced and a life cycle based sequence of events which led to the risk from the defect
being realised.
Channel 4's air crash investigation series (S 12 E 13) suggests that training has not made the
transition to flying automated craft. Flight AF 447, from a quality airline using an Airbus
330, was scheduled to make the 11 hour flight from Rio de Janeiro to Paris. The expectations
were that it would take off manually continue on autopilot, and then hand back to manual
control for the final two minutes of landing. Air accident investigator Dr Matthew Greaves
observes the healthy track record of the flying crew with 11,000, 6500, and 3000 hours of
flying attributed to the captain, co-pilot, and first officer respectively.
The crash of AF 447 (Ministère del’Écologie, 2012) can be attributed to the formation of ice
crystals in equipment designed to measure speed. This was the start of a number of events
which were known but were expected to be within airmanship of pilots to identify. The
pilots’ reaction contributed to the loss of other sources of airspeed information. Here we find
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challenge of describing incidents without biasing the description against the favour of the
operators (the pilots).

The report by the French aviation authority lists the loss of information by known causes
which should have been interpreted by the pilots. The report into the incident (Ministère
del’Écologie, 2012) describes that difficult flying conditions at high altitude in turbulence
resulted in excessive manoeuvres by the pilot which then further exacerbated interpretability
of the instrumentation. The report goes on to say that any errors on the part of the pilot flying
were no longer subject to warnings which might be reasonably expected from the
instrumentation. And this seems surprising. If the conditions can be articulated in a report,
one might expect that they may be modelled in software. The report continues to describe
how the combination of a stalled aircraft, the recovery manoeuvre, and the ergonomics of
how the crisis is reported to the crew, was not conducive to effecting the correct behaviours
in such a situation (with various recommendations for improved training). The report may
therefore be interpreted as blaming the pilots for not behaving accordingly. However it is
explains that the Spartan information which was available was on the one hand providing
insufficient data to act on, and on the other, providing information to which they could not be
expected to act reasonably with.

Let us take a moment to consider financial information systems. Much is made of the
propensity for human failures to lie at the root of fraud – poor management of passwords,
careless handling of documentation for example – that the hue and cry to educate users draws
up longer and longer pieces of advice for the user to compensate for the computerization (not
necessarily the automation) of business processes which were designed to be secure when
face-to-face transactions were commonplace or at least allowed for an anti-Turing
consideration (Turing, 1950) of who was at the other end of a telephone line or standing in
line at a telegraph office. Operational activity will often require codification into checklists
(Gawande, 2010) as an assurance process. But this requires discipline. Although it is
unreasonable (Sasse and Johnson, 1999) to expect it of digital natives and indeed most digital
immigrants, there is certainly a place for checklists in planes and hospitals to name but a few.

There is not a deterministic solution but there is a problem solving philosophy where
intention is everything. Ashby (Pickering, 2002) observes that only variation can force
variation down. It is therefore the responsibility of every system designer to create systems
6

with pathways that that can grow to face down the emergent properties of the many pathways
(Dresner and Jones, 2014) represented by the owners, actors, and customers and their antiimages who would do harm to the system or misuse that system for their own nefarious
objectives.

Furthermore organisational factors very often have a profound effect on both the delivered
system and the design process (Loucopoulos, 2005). Successful innovations must not only be
technically feasible and desirable to consumers but also viable from a business point of view
(Brown 2007). A business has to develop features consistent with its goals if it is to become
an effective competitor (Pearlson and Saunders, 2012). In other words, the alignment of
enterprise and systems increases the likelihood that an Information System will be created
that provides maximum value for the enterprise and the IS will be able to be supported.
Computing devices, human interaction with them, and people within the organisation create
variety where pathways will be traceable to a human action with a tendency to label this as
cause and effect.

This paper puts forward a framework for early systems development that focuses on
organisational factors, increasing business IS/IT alignment and reducing the likelihood of
system failure and associated blame. The subsequent sections are organized as follows:
section two discusses further background details related to Requirements Engineering (RE)
and associated knowledge management; the framework is put forward in section three and
conclusions drawn in section four.

2.0 Requirements Engineering and knowledge management
There is a clear need for a solid foundation to be established early in systems development. It
is here – at the latest – when the definition of system pathways will begin to emerge.
Important detail missed at an early stage risk large problems later in development and
subsequent system failure leading to the attribution of blame. Requirements Engineering
(RE) could be compared to the construction of a house, in which the process of laying the
foundations is particularly significant for supporting the walls and columns. Similarly the RE
process provides a base for further systems development or, in the case of system-intensive
organisations, change management. Any faults or weaknesses at the early stages tend to
produce cracks, potentially leading to at best increases in time and money and at worst
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project destabilisation and failure.

Underpinning the foundations, or amendment of

requirements in the case of RE, can be performed to add further support, although often
costly, difficult and inconvenient.

In spite of many research efforts and the development of a range of RE techniques for a
systems’ functionality, system failures still continue to be attributed to, among other factors,
requirements issues. When defining functional and non-functional requirements individuals
often consider only their personal requirements, without thinking about the company’s
overall goals (Chmura and Crockett, 1995). Currently if an organisation practices strategic
planning at all, a gap often exists between its strategic statements and the corresponding
Information Systems (Chmura and Crockett, 1995).

Like the acorn contains the fractal

formula for the spreading oak, so we must imbue our systems development with the formulae
to find implicit requirements amongst the explicit and control the emergent requirements so
that they are duly implemented with respect to the original objectives of the system…as they
continue to be derived.

Why should we want to do this? Because the prediction of pathways through any hardware,
software, and wetware combination is going to be challenging. Work by Beer and Ashby
(Pickering, 2002) in cybernetics demonstrate that to control those pathways, so that the
original fractal can continue to grow safely, is another order-of-magnitude-challenging. The
popular expectation – perhaps misconception - of computing power is determinism but the
route to that end will comprise non-deterministic meanderings. To enable communications
along that route through the pathways must be nurtured and curated – orchestrated - to enable
control to take place.
‘Knowledge itself is power’ (Bacon, 1597, p.69). From an organisational point of view,
properly used knowledge assets, for example, underlying skills, routines, practices,
principles, formulas, methods, heuristics and intuition, whether explicit or tacit, enable an
organisation to improve its efficiency, effectiveness and profitability (Jessup and Valacich,
2006). These assets can also help to create a sustainable competitive advantage (Nonaka et
al.. 2005). Furthermore knowledge is recognised as one of the most important sources of
innovation and new customer value propositions, emanating from individual, organisational
and communal knowledge creativity and utilisation (Leibold et al., 2005).
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The world has become too complex for individuals to have the knowledge necessary to tackle
problems by themselves (Fischer, 2007). Reports of an accident at the Alton Towers theme
park (Financial Times, 2015) ascribed blame to the ride operator misinterpreting a system
message and allowing a ride to continue in a dangerous state. One must question if the design
of the system put responsibility for hazardous-to-life situations on an operator who was not
supported by electromechanical constraints to prevent operations in an unsafe environment.

Existing approaches typically concentrate on the representation of contextual knowledge
about the usage world and neglect the system and subject or domain worlds (Pohl and
Haumer, 1997). Developers do not always understand the problem domain, particularly at
the beginning of a project, making it difficult to communicate (Ambler, 2016). Knowledge
of the domain tends to be ad-hoc and thinly spread throughout the development team,
potentially leading to misinformed models, conflict and ambiguities together with a
compromise in productivity and quality (Curtis et al., 1988). This knowledge can be spread
over a plethora of documentation, artefacts and technologies and stored in the minds of
stakeholders. Indeed knowledge which is relevant to complex problems is often distributed
among many people (Fischer, 2007 and Carr et al., 2003). Much of this knowledge is tacit in
nature and needs to be made explicit in order to be used within RE. Gruenbacher and Briggs
(2001) observe that if tacit stakeholder knowledge remains hidden the following problems
occur: incomplete requirements because ‘obvious’ ideas are not captured; reduced ability to
identify conflict because not all project-relevant knowledge is explicitly available; conflicting
interpretations due to terminology differences; hidden stakeholder expectations and
assumptions not explicitly available. Through conceptualisation, elicitation and ultimately
articulation, typically in collaboration with others, some proportion of a person’s tacit
knowledge may be captured in explicit form (Marwick, 2001).
Jackson (1995) attributes stakeholders’ requirements, which cannot be focused on, to the
incorrect identification of the application domain during conceptual modelling. (Dano et al.,
1997) notes that the description of Use Cases in natural language facilitates communication
between analyst and domain expert, but increases the risk of ambiguity, inconsistency and
incompleteness due to the variance of word meanings. In order to avoid such problems with
natural language, it is important to use a more structured or formal technique for their
description. EasyWinWin (Gruenbacher, 2000) provides clarity of the meaning of terms
through the use of a glossary, enabling tacit knowledge to be shared among stakeholders.
9

(Weidenhaupt et al., 1998) also use a glossary by intertwining it with scenarios, facilitating a
common understanding of terms among different stakeholder groups. In particular new
project members were able to become familiar with project terminology. Fensel (2010)
supports the provision of shared and common domain structures which are becoming
essential and a key asset in information exchange.

3.0 A framework for elaborating requirements
The proposed conceptual framework aims to enable stakeholders to consider the multitude of
issues relating to the impact of requirements on the organisation and societal environment
during the early stages of development. The ultimate aim is the delivery of useful and
sustainable systems that are aligned to enterprise strategy, together with reducing errors later
in development resulting in the attribution of blame.
The proposed Requirements Elaboration Framework is shown as a meta-model in Figure 3.
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Figure 3 Requirements Elaboration Framework meta-model

The framework is comprised of two parts, namely requirements definition and requirements
elaboration. It is considered that there are many existing methods (e.g. RUP, Booch, Agile)
and tools (e.g. Together, Rationale Rose) that address the requirements definition issue,
whereas requirements elaboration lacks support.

Requirements definition takes place prior to requirements elaboration. Business strategic
objectives direct the composition of strategic requirements.

Strategic requirements can

inform strategic objectives following requirements elaboration. Strategic requirements are
met by differing Information System functional and non-functional requirements, depending
on the IS strategy. Goal decomposition graphs traditionally provide the pre-traceability
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between high level strategic concerns and low level technical constraints; therefore
facilitating the propagation of business changes onto system features (Rolland, 2005).
However the proposed framework raises the point that system requirements are not simply
derived linearly through an analysis of business goals but often these business goals are
influenced through alternative implementation choices (Loucopoulos, 2009).

Requirements elaboration aims to facilitate the systematic modelling and evaluation of
requirements on the organisation during early development for the purpose of aligning the
organisation and Information System.

The components and relationships between

components within requirements elaboration, namely System Dynamics modelling, ontology
modelling, scenario modelling and rationale modelling, are discussed in the following
subsections.

3.1 System Dynamics Model
The development of a System Dynamics model is central to the process of elaborating
requirements, providing a means for a shared understanding of the impact of requirements
amongst stakeholders. (Gero and Smith, 2007) suggest that the agent for design should be
dynamic and able to handle change in order to cope with the exploration of complexity that
characterises design. In contrast the static nature of conceptual models does not reflect the
relationships that comprise business reality which are non-linear and dynamic. The use of
System Dynamics (Forrester, 1998; Sterman, 2000; Morecroft, 2015) is particularly suitable
in meeting these requirements. “The System Dynamics approach is also pertinent to the
engagement of multiple stakeholders due to its iterative nature and the enablement of the
consideration of problems and causes within the system context” (Garfield and Loucopoulos,
2009). “Such modelling also assists in reducing biases, uncertainties and conflicts amongst
stakeholders together with forming a foundation for the development of scenarios”
(Loucopoulos and Garfield, 2009, p.355).

The model is constructed from strategic requirements and describes the dynamics of the
organisation and its interaction to the proposed system.
development is informed by the ontology model.

System Dynamics model

Through its relationship to strategic

requirements, it can provide feedback on concepts such as legislation, finance, resources etc,
that would be of value to the analysis of requirements and by extension to business objectives
12

(Loucopoulos and Garfield, 2009). The System Dynamics model is also used as the structure
upon which alternative scenarios can be generated and explored.
Its method of construction is intended to enable the testing of key system parameters under
different conditions and subsequently the observation of a holistic view of system behaviour
under these conditions. “This implies that the model needs to be constructed in such a way so
as to permit multiple interpretations of it” (Loucopoulos and Garfield, 2009, p.355). The
construction of the model is therefore informed by system functional and non-functional
requirements according to differing Information Systems strategies to support multiple
interpretations.

The System Dynamics model is also intended to describe the feedback between various
system components. Taking this into consideration and that a business strategy is likely to be
influenced by different perspectives, the approach encourages the development of four
interlinked sub-model viewpoints. These are similar to that suggested by the Balanced
Scorecard (BSC) (Kaplan and Norton, 1992), namely customer, financial, business processes
and learning and growth. The framework provided by the Balanced Scorecard enables an
organisation’s vision and mission to be translated into measurable parameters, which are
largely indicators of future performance.

The consideration of such perspectives provides a comprehensive view of a business.
Therefore by forcing senior managers to consider all important operational measures
together, the Balanced Scorecard lets them see whether improvement in one area may have
been achieved at the expense of another (Kaplan and Norton, 1992). In contrast to the BSC,
earlier methodologies focused on financial measures alone, such as Activity-Based Costing
(Consortium-for-Advanced-Manufacturing-International, 2009).

Financial figures alone

suffer from two major drawbacks: they are historical; it is common for the current market
value of an organisation to exceed the market value of its assets. Managers want a balanced
presentation of both financial and operational measures (Kaplan and Norton. 1992).

The use of System Dynamics, which focuses exclusively on feedback structures, provides an
excellent vehicle for evaluating the interrelations between sub-model viewpoints.

In

particular feedback within and between sub-model viewpoints can provide means for
stakeholders to visualise trade-offs, by considering all important operational measures
13

together. (Bianchi and Montemaggiore, 2008) matched the System Dynamics methodology
with the Balanced Scorecard framework in the Dynamic Balanced Scorecard (DBSC). A
case study of an Italian city water company was used to demonstrate benefits of its use for
enhancing strategy design and planning. The use of a dynamic Balanced Scorecard enabled
managers to better understand cause and effect relationships between variables pertaining to
the four traditional Balanced Scorecard perspectives. Furthermore it successfully enhanced
“managers’ learning and capability to identify causal relationships between policy levers and
company performance, and better communicate strategy with stakeholders” (Bianchi and
Montemaggiore, 2008, p.200).
3.2 Ontology Model
The explicit representation and management of knowledge in the conceptual framework, in
the form of an ontology model, provides a shared stakeholder understanding of concepts
relating to the application and enterprise domain. This is particularly useful as stakeholders’
knowledge is not uniform and different meanings can be attached to the same concept.
Furthermore technical jargon can act as a barrier to communication (e.g. (Knott et al., 2000))
and conceptual misunderstandings can block or distort communication (Burton, 1980).
Indeed it is difficult to carry out meaningful designing activities during model development if
the domain is unclear.

This fulfils the need for a shared understanding of knowledge

advocated by (Fischer, 2007), who notes that the world has become too complex for
individuals to have the knowledge necessary to tackle problems by themselves. Knowledge
that is thinly spread throughout the development team, which is frequently the case, can lead
to misinformed models, conflict and ambiguities together with a compromise in productivity
and quality (Curtis et al., 1988). Coupled with this it is difficult for developers to understand
the problem domain at the beginning of a project (Ambler, 2016). Therefore formalised
knowledge can assist in solidifying concepts within the application and enterprise domain.
Wiegers (2003) notes that analysts that understand the application domain often detect
unstated assumptions and implicit requirements together with suggesting ways that users
could improve their business processes and minimise miscommunication with users.

The ontology model provides a strategic context for requirements.

It is used for the

articulation and negotiation of concepts during the designing and development of the System
Dynamics model. This increases the probability that all relevant knowledge is used when
requirements are modelled.
14

Structuring knowledge makes the identification and location of concepts by stakeholders
easier.

An ontology is considered a particularly appropriate way of representing and

structuring knowledge, due to its knowledge management capabilities and encouragement of
the standardisation of terms used to represent knowledge about the domain (Chandrasekaran
et al., 1999; Jurisica et al., 1999). If knowledge is not formally structured to inform decisions
during RE, it is easy to overlook important details and leave modelling more prone to
conflicts, misunderstandings and incompleteness (Loucopoulos and Garfield, 2009).
Concepts are represented and structured in a semantically rich superclass-subclass hierarchy
of invariant components related to the domain in the ontology model. Properties, e.g. object
and data type, together with individuals or instances, form the basis of each class. Assertions
(e.g. restrictions/constraints) and rules assist in determining relationships between concepts.

The as_is ontology can be an existing ontology or created from new. The structure of the
classes of this ontology use a typical business structure, in the form of actors, goals, processes
and objects and are linked via assertions. This enables different business attributes to be
formalised and structured.
3.3 Scenarios Model
The scenarios model facilitates stakeholders’ evaluation of the trade-off effects of different
possible requirements futures among on the organisation and societal environment for the
determination of strategic viability. The ultimate aim being the alignment of the organisation
and IS.

The behaviour of a range of alternatives under different conditions needs to be enabled in
order to understand how an organisation changes over time, in relation to the proposed IS.
“This means that areas for improvement can be identified, new ideas tested and most
importantly get an understanding of how a system works without taking any significant risks”
(Loucopoulos and Garfield, 2009, p.355). Indeed in order to negotiate, a range of possibilities
need to be explored (Easterbrook, 1991). Furthermore the generation of ideas and alternative
solutions on early design questions can assist with stakeholder engagement (InternationalFinance-Group, 2007), by providing a catalyst for communication, helping to bridge the gap
between various stakeholders and requirements engineers (Pohl and Haumer, 1997). The
observation of the patterns of behaviour provide an indication of the basic feedback structures
during the period covered (Sterman, 2000).
15

Scenarios enable a reduction in complexity (Weidenhaupt et al., 1998). Furthermore (Rowe
et al. 1994) observe that scenarios have become increasingly powerful tools for developing
strategic vision within organisations and for assisting executives to identify critical future
paths. Scenarios can also help to balance the need for flexibility and informality with
reference to creativity, as there is a need to progress systematically toward creating effective
and usable computer systems and applications (Carroll, 1995, p.15).

Experience has shown that stakeholders have difficulties in comprehending qualitative
models and, even more significantly, have difficulties in extrapolating from the model to the
potential behaviour of the system according to different design options available to them
(Loucopoulos and Prekas, 2003). “Whilst qualitative-based conceptual modelling approaches
seem to be an improvement on purely linguistic-based approaches, they fail to bridge the
communication gap between client stakeholders and analysts” (Loucopoulos and Garfield,
2009, p.357). There is therefore a need for the quantitative analysis of requirements to
determine essential elements of the system and possible measures of future performance on
elements of the system. The quantitative dimension of System Dynamics compliments its
qualitative nature, enabling stakeholders to subject the model to simulation. The alteration of
critical variable values facilitates the testing of scenario behaviour under different conditions.
Nevertheless qualitative and quantitative properties are not separate concerns and both are
required to support business scenario analysis (Lang, 2000).
3.4 Ontology and Scenario Rationale Model
“Rationale provides a way of documenting decisions together with underlying arguments,
promoting critical reflection, negotiation and location of inconsistencies” (Garfield and
Loucopoulos, 2009). Essentially it provides stakeholders with reasoning regarding how and
why decisions are made, which frequently is not the case during modelling activities (e.g.
(Conklin and Yakemovic, 1991; Gotel and Finkelstein, 1994; Pohl, 2010; Ramesh et al.,
1997)). Stakeholders are able to understand one another’s perceptions of the negotiation
together with the point of view from which the system is constructed (Kangassalo, 1999). In
contrast an undefined, unclear rationale is more likely to be associated with poor design
(Burge and Brown, 2000), and can lead to assumptions about a model that are conflicting.
This can potentially increase uncertainties, leading to the delivery of a flawed system.
Stakeholders need to be able to visualise theirs and others arguments (Karacapilidis and
16

Papadias, 2001). Rationale provides a mechanism for representing assumptions explicitly.
Visualisation of arguments assists with stakeholder communication.

In particular

visualisation of negotiation information facilitates stakeholders’ understanding of
negotiations through the simplification of the complex and massive negotiation of data (In
and Roy 2002).
The type of rationale selected for this research takes the form of collaborative visualised
argumentation, based on the principles of (Rittel and Webber, 1973). This form of rationale
is particularly suitable as it consists of the problems and issues that arise in the course of a
design, along with pros and cons for each alternative (Shipman and McCall, 1997). The
collaborative element is applicable to the negotiation process, which needs to take place in a
collaborative environment to allow the elicitation of all relevant alternatives and arguments
(e.g. (Easterbrook, 1991; Robinson and Fickas, 1994; Pohl, 2010)).

Rationale provides support for traceability. This is important as the development process
leading to the requirements specification must be traceable, so that the requirements
themselves can be understood, i.e. to trace a requirement back to its origin (Pohl, 2010). It
must also be assured that the life of every single requirement can be reconstructed and that
people not involved in the process can understand how and why the requirements
specification was produced in a particular way (Pohl, 2010).

The following two sub-sections outline the rationale components (ontology rationale and
scenario rationale), which work in parallel with ontology and scenarios in the proposed
framework. Both ontology and scenario rationale are a by-product of the design process,
rather than a separate task which, as suggested by (Burge and Brown, 2000), reduces the
workload for stakeholders.

4.0 Conclusions
One is reminded of the poet John Donne’s (2012) assertion that ‘no man is an island’ from
the aptly named ‘Devotions Upon Emergent Occasions’. And apart from extreme cases where
evidence points to deliberate intervention of an operator (pilot) to destroy ‘the system’ (the
plane) such as the Germanwings disaster (2015), and crashes in Namibia (2013) and a flight
from Indonesia to Singapore (1997) (BBC, 2015). If the computer cannot understand what's
going on - the system is outside the envelope of normal operations - and the computer passes
17

control back to the operator, does the operator appreciate that computer-controlled safeguards
may be neutralised too? Although one of course would not advocate the flying of a plane
with what is essentially an instruction manual in one hand, there is a case to model the correct
actions in training situations using checklists where patterns are known (Gawande, 2010).
These remove the reliance on the need to hastily remember vital sequence-based information
when under pressure. Without deliberate, probably malicious, intention there is no fair
attribution of blame to the focal actor in the software life cycle at the time of the incident.

We should question the design decisions which lead to the segregation of requirements into
those which are designed in and those which are declared as within the decision making
capability of the operator. As for example happened with Air France 447 where the loss of
the first air speed indicator to ice crystals was declared within the knowledge of pilots to
identify and therefore not programmed into any of the Airbus A330-203 warning systems.

By enabling reasoning and decision-making to be made explicit (i.e. through the ontology and
scenario rationale in the proposed framework) and formalising knowledge within the
ontology model, the understanding of the system and specification can begin to loose its
traditionally opaque nature and potentially assist in the reduction of system failure and
associated blame. Furthermore stakeholders can become familiar with alternative futures in
the scenarios model. The ontology model can assist with the typically unsure nature of
stakeholder system views, through detailing what already exists within the enterprise domain,
to provide a benchmark for innovations.

Have we chanced upon the dilemma that to blame human error is to blame being human. The
brief to the engineer is not to design with unnatural expectations in mind. The desirable
system will comprise systems which restrict genuine errors without operators becoming blasé
to the frequent alerts that these will generate.
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